It is generally agreed that moving up the path of value added production is one possible way to achieve sustainable economic growth, and that African countries tend to lag far behind in this respect. Keys to the emergence of value-added chains are, among others, reliable infrastructure and access to high-quality services. Thus, trade in infrastructural and other services is highly relevant to policies aiming at promoting value added production. As such it is worthwhile analysing the Chinese loans to African governments mentioned above in relation to their impact on the services sector, as these loans are essentially in- The core of the paper will discuss the extent to which the kind of SinoAfrican services trade currently in place may foster or hinder the emergence and growth of value addition on the African continent. In doing so, the paper will focus on the impact of the recent loan-attached Sino-African infrastructural services trade, as the latter has proven to be an essential aid-for-trade ingredient for value added chain creation and growth. In this context, the paper will benchmark the current achievements of this quite unique partnership between African countries and China with the range of possibilities granted by GATS and the potential advantages slumbering in a Sino-African FTA in services.
Introduction
This paper is focusing on the services aspect of the Sino-African economic cooperation. It is based on the literature centred on the crucial role of services in the creation of value-added chains: Every value-added chain requires reliable and cheap transportation (to move the commodities and semi-finished goods from one place of production to the next), reliable and cheap telecommunication (to organise the production, manage the value-added chain), access to finance (to build production sights, keep processes up to date), and access to specialist knowledge 2 . These basic services provide the soil for value-added production, and are the imminent link between commodity and final product.
China has identified infrastructure and the services sector long ago as an important aspect for economic development. Today, the services sector in China is growing strongly and capable of providing the basis for value-added production 3 . Most of Africa, however, lags far behind countries, the African services sector is roughly described as weak and fragmented 4 . It is, thus, not surprising that while China's economy consists of a multitude of different valueadded chains that process raw materials into internationally tradable goods, African economies are still to a very large extent depending on the export of commodities 5 .
However, part of China's official aid policy is to support African countries in developing their infrastructure and services sectors. The reasoning behind the Chinese aid policy is based on China's own development experience, in which services and infrastructure were identified as key aspects 6 . Thus, China's support of African economies is directed at infrastructure projects and the development of services sectors, both financially and on the ground.
The aim of this paper is to qualify the legal character of the Chinese engagement in African infrastructure projects and services sectors. The Chinese involvement is often based on state loans provided by the Chinese Exim bank 7 in return for oil or other commodities, and it is fairly unknown what legal rights and duties are attached to these kinds of agreements. Outlining possible implications of the legal character of the contracts based on this so-called Angola-Model provides the basis for a discussion on the policy-space in the Sino-African economic relationship and on more fundamental, systemic questions concerning the structure of international economic law.
Legal Characterisation of the Sino-African Economic Relationship
Legal characterisation has been defined as 'the intellectual operation that consists in classifying a fact, an action, an institution or a specific legal relationship in order to apply the relevant legal regime to it' 8 . It is the legal regime relevant in the case of Chinese engagement in African infrastructure projects that decides upon legal rights and duties, and consequently upon the room for negotiations.
However, the agreements attached to Chinese investments into the African infrastructure and services sector are not publicly available. Therefore, this chapter attempts to narrow down the legal character of these agreements based on what is publicly available and by outlining the implications of the different legal options. To be very concise in the legal characterisation of Sino-African investment treaties, one would need to have access to both the minutes of the negotiating-process and the actual treaty-texts.
Sino-African State Trading Based on the Barter System: The Case of Angola
While China respects national sovereignty and pursues a strict non-interference policy in relation to internal conflicts and human rights abuses 9 , it is also willing to find alternative pay- Trading based on the Barter system has a long history on the African continent and is still prevalent 12 . Chinese officials, thus, seem to have found a common language with African governments when negotiating over commodity backed state loans. While Western countries and companies will expect hard currency in return for their investments or loans 13 , the Chinese officials are happy to accept alternative ways of payment. At first glance, this approach seems to meet very nicely the Chinese interest in commodity supply, as well as the African interest in access to finance and strengthening of the economic infrastructure 14 .
These resource-backed financing agreements in Africa have become known as the 'Angola Model' 15 . The term is derived from the long history of Chinese investment in Angola. The model describes the typical concessional loan to African governments, of which the China Exim Bank is the sole lender. Such loans are given for infrastructure, social or industrial projects for which Chinese contractors must be awarded and in principle no less than 50 percent of the projects' procurement must come from China. The projects are determined by the local government 16 . In exchange for the loan, China typically secures oil or other commodities as collateral 17 . The structure of the Angola-Model can be described as in In relation to the legal characterisation, the extraordinary aspect of these contracts is the fact that the loans are only indirectly provided by the China Exim Bank by paying the Chinese company for accomplishing the projects agreed to by an African government.
Typically, state loans are based on a contract between two subjects of public law and, thus, part of public international law. In the case of the Sino-African loans under the AngolaModel, at first sight the contracts attached to the state loans are part of private law, because the Chinese company as the final receiver of the loan is not a subject of public law. However, this is disputed:
The ability of Chinese firms to invest in fragile states -such as Angola, the DRC, Sudan and Sierra Leone -is almost certainly linked to the political economy of the Thus, it could be argued that the fact that the China Exim Bank is wholly state-owned, acts in the interest and on behalf of the Chinese government, and deals with a Chinese company working in Africa arguably in the interest of the Chinese and the African governments, too, accounts for de facto public character of the contracts: the contracts are basically part of an agreement between two subjects of public international law, the African state and China.
Review past Debates: Public or Private International Law?
As mentioned earlier above, it is impossible to conduct a thorough analysis of the legal character of Sino-African investments in the infrastructural sector due to a lack of information about the actual content of the agreements. However, similar problems have been discussed before and might inform the debate in this context.
With globalisation and the emergence of giant MNCs, new global players joined the circle of nation states: corporations richer than many countries and highly influential on the stage of international politics. This led to a debate about the legal character of MNCs as they were quite clearly object of public international law and often also acting like a subject of public international law, but they were not bound to the rules of public international law. Consequently, their actions were attributed to the sphere of private international law although they often had a very public character 20 .
-9 -When in the late 70ies and early 80ies the rising MNCs began to invest in developing countries in return for oil-concessions, the term 'economic development agreement' was devel-
oped. An economic development agreement was defined as:
Their subject matter is particularly broad: they are not concerned only with an isolated purchase or performance, but tend to bring to developing countries investments and technical assistance, particularly in the field of research and exploitation of mineral resources, or in the construction of factories on a turnkey basis. 21 [It] is a broad term for agreements covering direct investment, which characterises the role of the investment, the term implying mutuality of obligation. It's a collaboration of a special type, which cannot reasonably be included in the orbit of some particular internal law. They are viewed as a genus tertius between treaties and contracts 22 .
The Sino-African investments based on the Angola-Model correspond more or less with these early so-called economic development agreements. Although today's Sino-African investments are more sophisticated and bundle more obligations and concessions together, the basic approach is the same: development assistance in return for economic benefits.
It has been argued that if the contract is an 'economic development agreement', then it's due to its nature rooted in the international legal system 23 . Such an agreement aims at securing national interests and deals with the rights and obligations of a public good (e.g. resources).
Thus, the body of international law was criticised for its restriction to relations between states claiming that this restriction may be seen as normative, and that it was clear that 'contemporary international law is not exclusively restricted to relations between States, but extends increasingly to individuals and other non-State entities' 24 .
However, this viewpoint did not become widely accepted, because there was not enough evidence substantiating the public character of the contracts between the governments of developing countries and MNCs. Also, lifting the legal status of MNCs up to the level of a nation state seemed too far-fetched and not reasonable 25 .
In contrast, the circumstances are somewhat different in the case of Sino-African investment agreements: While Northern MNCs clearly are a subject of private law and are neither controlled nor owned by a government, the Chinese MNCs are usually wholly state-owned andcontrolled. In the particular case of the China Exim Bank, such control and ownership is official. Thus, the contracting party vis-à-vis the African government is not acting like a subject of private law, but like a subject of private law de facto doing the job which elsewhere the minister of finance or international economic relations, a subject of public law, would do.
The main arguments against the public character of the economic development agreements do, thus, not apply to the case of Sino-African investment agreements. Therefore, reviewing the debate about the public or private character of such contracts in the specific case of China would be worthwhile as the outcome might turn out to be quite the opposite: the Sino-African investment contracts might turn out to be an ordinary treaty between two states.
The Implications of Private International Law on the Angola-Model
If the Chinese company receiving paid by the loan was beyond doubt acting as a subject of private law, independent from the Chinese government's interests, it could be argued that the -11 -
The law applying to the contract is, thus, due to its international nature depending on the rules of the relevant conflict of laws (private international law).
In private international law, the contracting parties can choose the governing law of the contract. This is based on the principle of freedom of choice of law, probably the most well known rule of private international law. In absence of a choice of law, a relevant tribunal may determine the governing law. Usually, the choice of law is that of the host country. In our case, this means that the law of the respective African country is applied to the contract.
However, it is quite common to de-localise the governing law by replacing the law of the host country with a reference to 'the general principles of law' 26 .
As the contracts negotiated by the China Exim Bank, African governments and Chinese companies are not publicly available; the choice of law in contracts related to the Angola Model is unknown. It can generally be said that it is to the advantage of the host country if its own law is chosen. Also, the reference to the general principles of law allows for more flexibility in the content and in the governing of the contract as they require interpretation and are less specific. It would, therefore, be rather to the advantage of the China Exim Bank and the Chinese companies, if the contracting parties agreed to choose only to refer to the general principles of law.
In private international law, the contracting parties cannot only choose the governing law, but also the forum for dispute-settlement 27 . In the case of choice of forum, more or less the same is true as has been said before: solving a dispute before the courts of the host country tends to 26 PAASIVIRTA, E. (1990), p. 56. 27 See relevant rules of applying Conflict of Laws (private international law).
be to the advantage of the host country, choosing any other forum is generally in the interest of the other contracting party.
Generally, if the contract falls under the umbrella of private international law, one national law or the general principles of law govern the contract. This means that the only limitations to the content of the agreement stem from the governing law. This law also decides upon the consequences of a breach of contract, which will be treated just like any other breach of contract. In addition, the legal protection of investments and properties based on a contract of private international law tends to be stronger, because bilateral or multilateral investment protection agreements on the state-level will provide for additional protection 28 .
The Implications of Public International Law on the Angola-Model
If -what is more likely to be the case here -the contracts between the China Exim Bank, African governments and Chinese companies fall in fact under the governmental framework agreement of a loan based on the Angola-Model, the contracts would be governed by public international law, too.
In public international law, all ratified conventions and international agreements, particularly also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the body of international economic law, the principles of public international law and ius cogens are relevant for a treaty between two states. The content of the Chinese contract with the African government based on the Angola-Model is, thus, directly restricted by the rules and norms of public international law.
-13 -Although this restriction of the content is in the particular case of contracts based on the Angola-Model not directly match-making, it is so indirectly: The two states are allowed to negotiate any kind of deal as long as it does not violate ius cogens 29 . The violation of other obligations of public international law would naturally have consequences, too.
Generally, it is not known whether or not the contracts based on the Angola Model are consistent with public international law up to every detail. Concerns have been raised particularly in reference to human rights, labour and environmental standards, thus, it would at least be worthwhile to remain cautious until such a contract is actually examined properly 30 .
Furthermore, it is not known if in some cases the contracts based on the Angola-Model amount to a kind of de facto preferential access to the African market for Chinese companies.
If that would be the case, a number of norms and principles of international economic law would be relevant for the legal examination of the contracts: the requirements for PTAs of both GATS and GATT and the principle of MFN 31 . In order to achieve transparency, a con- When the political establishment of a country like South Africa comes to the conclusion that it has not the economic capacity to profit from an FTA with China, it is difficult to imagine that any other -less developed -African country would do so, particularly in the services sector. Consequently, there are no other FTAs -neither in goods, nor in services -between African countries and China currently under negotiations.
Legal Qualification of the Services Part in the Angola-Model
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is evidence pointing towards the public character of contracts based on the Angola-Model. To be able to do a thorough and concise analysis, access to the legal texts would be required. However, the interesting legal question in this context -which can be discussed on a theoretical level -is whether or not the Angola-Modelcontracts are consistent with the provisions of the GATS if the latter applied.
The infrastructure projects and supply of services financed by the China Exim Bank have a considerable impact on value-added chains: transportation, telecommunication, technical assistance and knowledge-transfer usually lie at the heart of these projects 43 . However, services provided in the exercise of governmental authority -as part of government procurement -are outside the scope of GATS 44 . As the exact scope of the GATS provisions on government procurement still remains open for interpretation, there is uncertainty about whether or not a particular policy is excluded from MFN.
In addition, due to on-going negotiations on the accession to the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) of China, the current legal framework for government procurement in China might soon change and new obligations might render past negotiating strategies impossible 45 . The legal framework for government procurement is generally highly fragmented and so far only to a small extent regulated on a multilateral level. For instance, some African countries have adopted legislative text based on the UNCITRAL model law on procurement of goods, construction and services 46 , some lenders require their own procurement plans 47 , while in some cases no legislation applies at all. However, this legal fragmentation is likely to diminish in the coming few years as there are ongoing negotiations on different levels on a multilateral legal framework for government procurement 48 
Does the Angola-Model allow more or less Policy-Space than GATS?
Currently, the Angola-Model certainly allows for more policy-space than would be the case if the Sino-African economic cooperation was solely based on GATS commitments. However, as there is considerable concern over the legal nature of individual contracts with Chinese companies involved in infrastructure projects, and the legal framework governing them, these contracts should be very carefully drafted. Also, the accession to the GPA might change the overall application of Angola-Model based loans.
In any case, the main concern in the case of the services sector is the requirement to employ
Chinese companies for the loan. Neither is there, thus, any kind of competition in the con- 
Conclusion
Given the concerns over the content and legal character of contracts between the China Exim Bank, African governments and Chinese companies, there is need for more transparency and publicity of the Chinese loans to African countries. Increased transparency would not only be of interest to the international community and third countries, but would benefit particularly the people concerned as these contracts essentially deal with public goods.
As has been outlined and discussed in this paper, depending on the legal character of contracts with Chinese companies, the implications for the content and consistency with the body of international economic law differ greatly. In addition, it is questionable whether these sideagreements really support development in African countries, because of the strict concession to hire Chinese companies and employees for the projects financed by the Chinese loan.
Furthermore, due to the pending accession of China to the GPA, and ongoing negotiations over a multilateral legal framework on government procurement, the Angola-Model based loans to African countries will have to be re-examined in any case: They are not consistent with the requirements imposed by the GPA to date. Therefore, the discussed room for policy and negotiation for African governments related to the different legal instruments of international economic cooperation and integration could be of interest for future negotiations over
Sino-African state loans.
